SPRZ496C October   2021  – January 2024 TMS320F280033 , TMS320F280034 , TMS320F280034-Q1 , TMS320F280036-Q1 , TMS320F280036C-Q1 , TMS320F280037 , TMS320F280037-Q1 , TMS320F280037C , TMS320F280037C-Q1 , TMS320F280038-Q1 , TMS320F280038C-Q1 , TMS320F280039 , TMS320F280039-Q1 , TMS320F280039C , TMS320F280039C-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2.   TMS320F28003x Real-Time MCUs Silicon ErrataSilicon Revision 0
  3. 1Usage Notes and Advisories Matrices
    1. 1.1 Usage Notes Matrix
    2. 1.2 Advisories Matrix
  4. 2Nomenclature, Package Symbolization, and Revision Identification
    1. 2.1 Device and Development-Support Tool Nomenclature
    2. 2.2 Devices Supported
    3. 2.3 Package Symbolization and Revision Identification
  5. 3Silicon Revision 0 Usage Notes and Advisories
    1. 3.1 Silicon Revision 0 Usage Notes
      1. 3.1.1 PIE: Spurious Nested Interrupt After Back-to-Back PIEACK Write and Manual CPU Interrupt Mask Clear
      2. 3.1.2 Caution While Using Nested Interrupts
      3. 3.1.3 Security: The primary layer of defense is securing the boundary of the chip, which begins with enabling JTAGLOCK and Zero-pin Boot to Flash feature
    2. 3.2 Silicon Revision 0 Advisories
      1. 3.2.1 Advisory
      2.      Advisory
      3.      Advisory
      4.      Advisory
      5.      Advisory
      6.      Advisory
      7. 3.2.2 Advisory
      8.      Advisory
      9. 3.2.3 Advisory
      10.      Advisory
      11.      Advisory
      12.      Advisory
      13. 3.2.4 Advisory
      14.      Advisory
      15. 3.2.5 Advisory
      16. 3.2.6 Advisory
      17. 3.2.7 Advisory
      18.      Advisory
      19. 3.2.8 Advisory
      20. 3.2.9 Advisory
      21.      Advisory
      22.      Advisory
      23.      Advisory
      24.      Advisory
  6. 4Documentation Support
  7. 5Trademarks
  8. 6Revision History

3.1.3 Security: The primary layer of defense is securing the boundary of the chip, which begins with enabling JTAGLOCK and Zero-pin Boot to Flash feature

Revisions Affected: 0

Device security relies on the premise that unauthorized code is not allowed to enter the device and execute under any circumstances. To that end, the device provides two features that a user concerned about security should always enable.

  • JTAGLOCK

    When enabled in the USER OTP area of flash, the JTAGLOCK feature disables JTAG access (for example, debugger connection) to resources on the device, blocking an unauthorized party from using the JTAG interface to download any code into the device. When JTAGLOCK is enabled, the user can still allow an authorized party to unlock it by entering a password, or they can lock it permanently by programming a password value of all all-zeros.

     

  • Zero-pin Boot to Flash

    The external bootloaders built into the TI ROM do not perform any authentication of the downloaded code. Enabling the Zero-pin boot option along with a flash boot mode in the USER OTP blocks all pin-based external bootloader options (for example, SCI, CAN, Parallel) from running at boot by forcing the boot process to jump immediately to internal flash after the base boot ROM execution concludes. For highest security, the Secure Flash boot mode can be chosen. This enables a pre-check of the flash code by the base boot ROM before jumping to it.

If JTAG is locked permanently and the Zero-pin Boot to Flash option is enabled, programming tools that communicate with the device through JTAG or the built-in bootloaders will not work. If the ability to perform firmware upgrades is desired, the user must pre-store code in flash to securely manage and perform the update.