STDA060 October 2026 MSPM0G3519 , MSPM0G3519-Q1 , MSPM33C321A , MSPM33C321A-Q1
Classical computing refers to today's computers, which run defined operations as a series of discrete instructions. It is possible to parallelize these instructions in some situations, but the computing is limited to sequential operation or parallel sets of sequential operations.
Quantum computers, on the other hand, can take advantage of data bits that can be both "0" and "1" at the same time, allowing them to search a solution space simultaneously in a way that the computers of today cannot [1].
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) would theoretically be able to solve the ECDLP through the use of known algorithms. If such a quantum computer were to exist, it would break the hardness assumptions that make today's popular cryptographic primitives secure, such as ECDSA. An adversary could compromise the cryptographic primitive, thus compromising the security goal supported by the cryptographic primitive. A primary goal in attacking ECDSA is to recover the private key which is used to sign new messages as authentic, such that an adversary can then use the private key to sign fraudulent messages, producing valid signatures. This requires finding the private key value k given the public key P and public generator point G, where P = kG on an elliptic curve. With a classical computer, recovering k given the public values P and G is hard (known methods run in exponential time). With a CRQC, it can be possible to run Shor's algorithm: a quantum algorithm which reduces the attack from exponential time to polynomial time, making it practical to execute. At the time of this writing, quantum computers that are large and stable enough to execute algorithms – such as Shor's algorithm – that can compromise popular implementations of ECDSA (such as ECDSA using the National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST] P-256 curve) do not yet exist, but they may in the future.
While no one knows when a powerful enough quantum computer will exist that can break the classical cryptographic primitives of today [1], many industries are beginning to secure their products against future threats for these reasons:
As a result, we are seeing more embedded system designers moving to PQC cryptographic primitives to achieve security goals.