STDA060 October   2026 MSPM0G3519 , MSPM0G3519-Q1 , MSPM33C321A , MSPM33C321A-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2.   Abstract
  3.   Trademarks
  4. 1 Introduction
  5. 2 Security Goals in Embedded Systems
  6. 3 Cryptographic Primitives
  7. 4 The Potential Effects of CRQCs
  8. 5 New Algorithms and Standards for the Future
  9. 6 CNSA Compliance
  10. 7 Symmetric Encryption and Hash Functions
  11. 8 PQC Digital Signatures: ML-DSA
  12. 9 Is Hardware Acceleration Necessary?
  13. 10Is Pre-Hash Necessary?
  14. 11Other NIST-Selected PQC Digital Signature Schemes
  15. 12Stateful Digital Signature Schemes
  16. 13What About Key Agreement?
  17. 14Future-Proofing Embedded Systems
  18. 15References

The Potential Effects of CRQCs

Classical computing refers to today's computers, which run defined operations as a series of discrete instructions. It is possible to parallelize these instructions in some situations, but the computing is limited to sequential operation or parallel sets of sequential operations.

Quantum computers, on the other hand, can take advantage of data bits that can be both "0" and "1" at the same time, allowing them to search a solution space simultaneously in a way that the computers of today cannot [1].

A cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) would theoretically be able to solve the ECDLP through the use of known algorithms. If such a quantum computer were to exist, it would break the hardness assumptions that make today's popular cryptographic primitives secure, such as ECDSA. An adversary could compromise the cryptographic primitive, thus compromising the security goal supported by the cryptographic primitive. A primary goal in attacking ECDSA is to recover the private key which is used to sign new messages as authentic, such that an adversary can then use the private key to sign fraudulent messages, producing valid signatures. This requires finding the private key value k given the public key P and public generator point G, where P = kG on an elliptic curve. With a classical computer, recovering k given the public values P and G is hard (known methods run in exponential time). With a CRQC, it can be possible to run Shor's algorithm: a quantum algorithm which reduces the attack from exponential time to polynomial time, making it practical to execute. At the time of this writing, quantum computers that are large and stable enough to execute algorithms – such as Shor's algorithm – that can compromise popular implementations of ECDSA (such as ECDSA using the National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST] P-256 curve) do not yet exist, but they may in the future.

While no one knows when a powerful enough quantum computer will exist that can break the classical cryptographic primitives of today [1], many industries are beginning to secure their products against future threats for these reasons:

  • Building trusted new cryptography takes time, as does integrating it into products.
  • Many embedded systems have extended lifetimes of 10 or more years in the field. Addressing the potential invention of CRQCs now reduces the risk of lost security in the future.
  • Many markets are driving regulation, especially the enterprise and data center market.

As a result, we are seeing more embedded system designers moving to PQC cryptographic primitives to achieve security goals.