SLLA475 December   2020 TCAN1144-Q1 , TCAN1146-Q1

 

  1. 1TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Functional Safety Manual
  2. 2Trademarks
  3. 3Introduction
  4. 4TCAN114x-Q1 Hardware Component Functional Safety Capability
  5. 5Development Process for Management of Systematic Faults
    1. 5.1 TI New-Product Development Process
  6. 6TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Component Overview
    1. 6.1 Targeted Applications
    2. 6.2 Hardware Component Functional Safety Concept
    3. 6.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions
  7. 7Description of Hardware Component Parts
    1. 7.1 CAN Transceiver
    2. 7.2 Digital Core
    3. 7.3 EEPROM
    4. 7.4 Power Control IP
      1. 7.4.1 Voltage Monitors
    5. 7.5 Thermal Shut Down
    6. 7.6 Digital Input/Outputs
  8. 8TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Management of Random Faults
    1. 8.1 Fault Reporting
    2. 8.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories
    3. 8.3 Description of Functional Safety Mechanisms
      1. 8.3.1 CAN Communication
        1. 8.3.1.1 SM-1: CAN bus fault diagnostic
        2. 8.3.1.2 SM-2: Thermal shutdown; TSD
        3. 8.3.1.3 SM-3: CAN bus short circuit limiter, IOS
        4. 8.3.1.4 SM-4: CAN TXD pin dominant state timeout; tTXD_DTO
        5. 8.3.1.5 SM-17: CAN protocol
      2. 8.3.2 Supply Voltage Rail Monitoring
        1. 8.3.2.1 SM-5: VCC undervoltage; UVCC
        2. 8.3.2.2 SM-6: VSUP supply undervoltage; UVSUP
        3. 8.3.2.3 SM-7: VIO supply undervoltage; UVIO
      3. 8.3.3 SPI/Processor Communication
        1. 8.3.3.1 SM-8: Timout, Window or Q&A watchdog error - Normal mode
        2. 8.3.3.2 SM-9: SPI communication error; SPIERR
        3. 8.3.3.3 SM-10: Scratchpad write/read
        4. 8.3.3.4 SM-11: Sleep Wake Error Timer; tINACTIVE
      4. 8.3.4 Device Internal EEPROM
        1. 8.3.4.1 SM-12: Internal memory CRC; CRC_EEPROM
      5. 8.3.5 Floating Pins
        1. 8.3.5.1 SM-13: SCLK internal pull-up to VIO
        2. 8.3.5.2 SM-14: SDI internal pull-up to VIO
        3. 8.3.5.3 SM-15: nCS internal pull-up to VIO
        4. 8.3.5.4 SM-16: TXD internal pull-up to VIO
          1.        B Revision History

8 TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Management of Random Faults

For a functional safety critical development it is necessary to manage both systematic and random faults. The device architecture does not include any functional safety mechanisms which can detect and respond to random faults when used correctly. This section of the document describes the architectural functional safety concept for each sub-block of the device. The system integrator shall review the recommended functional safety mechanisms in the functional safety analysis report (FMEDA) in addition to this safety manual to determine the appropriate functional safety mechanisms to include in their system. The component data sheet or technical reference manual (if available) are useful tools for finding more specific information about the implementation of these features.