SLLA475 December   2020 TCAN1144-Q1 , TCAN1146-Q1

 

  1. 1TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Functional Safety Manual
  2. 2Trademarks
  3. 3Introduction
  4. 4TCAN114x-Q1 Hardware Component Functional Safety Capability
  5. 5Development Process for Management of Systematic Faults
    1. 5.1 TI New-Product Development Process
  6. 6TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Component Overview
    1. 6.1 Targeted Applications
    2. 6.2 Hardware Component Functional Safety Concept
    3. 6.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions
  7. 7Description of Hardware Component Parts
    1. 7.1 CAN Transceiver
    2. 7.2 Digital Core
    3. 7.3 EEPROM
    4. 7.4 Power Control IP
      1. 7.4.1 Voltage Monitors
    5. 7.5 Thermal Shut Down
    6. 7.6 Digital Input/Outputs
  8. 8TCAN1144-Q1 and TCAN1146-Q1 Management of Random Faults
    1. 8.1 Fault Reporting
    2. 8.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories
    3. 8.3 Description of Functional Safety Mechanisms
      1. 8.3.1 CAN Communication
        1. 8.3.1.1 SM-1: CAN bus fault diagnostic
        2. 8.3.1.2 SM-2: Thermal shutdown; TSD
        3. 8.3.1.3 SM-3: CAN bus short circuit limiter, IOS
        4. 8.3.1.4 SM-4: CAN TXD pin dominant state timeout; tTXD_DTO
        5. 8.3.1.5 SM-17: CAN protocol
      2. 8.3.2 Supply Voltage Rail Monitoring
        1. 8.3.2.1 SM-5: VCC undervoltage; UVCC
        2. 8.3.2.2 SM-6: VSUP supply undervoltage; UVSUP
        3. 8.3.2.3 SM-7: VIO supply undervoltage; UVIO
      3. 8.3.3 SPI/Processor Communication
        1. 8.3.3.1 SM-8: Timout, Window or Q&A watchdog error - Normal mode
        2. 8.3.3.2 SM-9: SPI communication error; SPIERR
        3. 8.3.3.3 SM-10: Scratchpad write/read
        4. 8.3.3.4 SM-11: Sleep Wake Error Timer; tINACTIVE
      4. 8.3.4 Device Internal EEPROM
        1. 8.3.4.1 SM-12: Internal memory CRC; CRC_EEPROM
      5. 8.3.5 Floating Pins
        1. 8.3.5.1 SM-13: SCLK internal pull-up to VIO
        2. 8.3.5.2 SM-14: SDI internal pull-up to VIO
        3. 8.3.5.3 SM-15: nCS internal pull-up to VIO
        4. 8.3.5.4 SM-16: TXD internal pull-up to VIO
          1.        B Revision History

8.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories

This section includes a description of the different types of functional safety mechanisms that are applied to the design blocks of the device.

The functional safety mechanism categories are defined as follows:

    Component Hardware Functional Safety MechanismsA safety mechanism that is implemented by TI in silicon which can communicate error status upon the detection of failures. The safety mechanism may require software to enable its functionality, to take action when a failure is detected, or both.
    Component Hardware and Software Functional Safety MechanismsA test recommended by TI which requires both, safety mechanism hardware which has been implemented in silicon by TI, and which requires software. The failure modes of the hardware used in this safety mechanisms are analyzed or described as part of the functional safety analysis or FMEDA. The system implementer is responsible for analyzing the software aspects for this safety mechanism.
    Component Software Functional Safety MechanismsA software test recommended by TI. The failure modes of the software used in this safety mechanism are not analyzed or described in the functional safety analysis or FMEDA. For some components, TI may provide example code or supporting code for the software functional safety mechanisms. This code is intended to aid in the development, but the customer shall do integration testing and verification as needed for their system functional safety concept.
    System Functional Safety MechanismsA safety mechanism implemented externally of this component. For example an external monitoring IC would be considered to be a system functional safety mechanism.
    Test for Safety MechanismsThis test provides coverage for faults on a safety mechanism only. It does not provide coverage for the primary function.
    Alternative Safety MechanismsAn alternative safety mechanism is not capable of detecting a fault of safety mechanism hardware, but instead is capable of recognizing the primary function fault (that another safety mechanism may have failed to detect). Alternate safety mechanisms are typically used when there is no direct test for a safety mechanism.