SLUUDG7A December   2025  â€“ November 2026 MSPM33C321A , MSPM33C321A-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2.   Abstract
  3.   Trademarks
  4. 1Overview of Security Functionality
    1. 1.1 Terminology
    2. 1.2 Platform Security Enablers
  5. 2Device Security Model
    1. 2.1 Device Identity
    2. 2.2 Initial Conditions at Boot
    3. 2.3 Boot Configuration Routine (BCR)
    4. 2.4 Bootstrap Loader (BSL)
    5. 2.5 Lifecycle Management
      1. 2.5.1 Lifecycle Transitions
    6. 2.6 Boot Service
    7. 2.7 Boot Flow
    8. 2.8 User-Specified Security Policies
      1. 2.8.1 Boot Configuration Routine (BCR) Policies
        1. 2.8.1.1 Serial Wire Debug Related Policies
          1. 2.8.1.1.1 No Restrictions Scenario
          2. 2.8.1.1.2 Custom Restrictions Scenario
          3. 2.8.1.1.3 Fully Restricted Scenario
        2. 2.8.1.2 Bootstrap Loader (BSL) Enable/Disable Policy
        3. 2.8.1.3 Flash Memory Protection and Integrity Related Policies
          1. 2.8.1.3.1 Locking the Application (MAIN) Flash Memory
          2. 2.8.1.3.2 Locking the Configuration (NONMAIN) Flash Memory
          3. 2.8.1.3.3 Security and Privilege Protection on Application (MAIN, DATA) Flash Memory
          4. 2.8.1.3.4 Verifying Integrity of Application (MAIN) Flash Memory
      2. 2.8.2 Bootstrap Loader (BSL) Security Policies
        1. 2.8.2.1 BSL Access Password
        2. 2.8.2.2 BSL Read-out Policy
        3. 2.8.2.3 BSL Security Alert Policy
      3. 2.8.3 Customer Secure Code (CSC) Security Policies
        1. 2.8.3.1 CSC Enforced Bankswap
        2. 2.8.3.2 CSC Key Write to KEYSTORE
      4. 2.8.4 Configuration Data Error Resistance
        1. 2.8.4.1 CRC-Backed Configuration Data
          1. 2.8.4.1.1 BCR Configuration CRC Fail Handling
          2. 2.8.4.1.2 TI Factory Trim Data CRC Fail Handling
        2. 2.8.4.2 BSL Configuration CRC Fail Handling
        3. 2.8.4.3 16-bit Pattern Match for Critical Fields
  6. 3Secure Boot
    1. 3.1 MCUBoot
    2. 3.2 ROM-based Secure Boot
      1. 3.2.1 ROM-based Secure Boot Flow
      2. 3.2.2 Customer Key Storage
        1. 3.2.2.1 Key Revocation Using the DSSM
        2. 3.2.2.2 Key Revocation Using the Firmware Update
      3. 3.2.3 Anti‑rollback Protection
    3. 3.3 CSC-based Secure Boot
      1. 3.3.1 CSC-based Secure Boot Flow
      2. 3.3.2 FLASH Memory Map
      3. 3.3.3 CSC Key Storage
        1. 3.3.3.1 Key Storage for CSC-based Secure Boot
        2. 3.3.3.2 KEYSTORE for AES
      4. 3.3.4 Bank Swap
      5. 3.3.5 CSC Protection
    4. 3.4 Two Stage Secure Boot
      1. 3.4.1 Two Stage Secure Boot Flow
  7. 4Secure Execution Environment
    1. 4.1 TrustZone
      1. 4.1.1 Implementation Defined Attribution Unit
      2. 4.1.2 Security Attribution Unit
        1. 4.1.2.1 Defining a Region as Secure
      3. 4.1.3 TrustZone Software Development
        1. 4.1.3.1 Defining Functions as Secure and Non-secure
    2. 4.2 Memory Protection Unit
      1. 4.2.1 TrustZone and MPU
    3. 4.3 Global Security Controller
      1. 4.3.1 GSC Memory Configuration
        1. 4.3.1.1 Security Exceptions Through the GSC and SAU
        2. 4.3.1.2 Privilege Exceptions With GSC and MPU
  8. 5Secure Storage
    1. 5.1 Write Erase Protection
      1. 5.1.1 Global Security Controller Configuration on WEP
      2. 5.1.2 NONMAIN FLASH Configuration on WEP
    2. 5.2 FLASH Hide Protection
      1. 5.2.1 Global Security Controller Configuration on HDP
    3. 5.3 Secure Key Storage
    4. 5.4 Data Integrity Verification
    5. 5.5 Secure and Privilege Protection
    6. 5.6 Hardware Monotonic Counter
  9. 6Security Modules
    1. 6.1 AESADV
      1. 6.1.1 AES Overview
      2. 6.1.2 AES Usage
        1. 6.1.2.1 Configuration
        2. 6.1.2.2 Setup
        3. 6.1.2.3 Operation
    2. 6.2 Keystore
      1. 6.2.1 Overview
      2. 6.2.2 Keystore Usage
        1. 6.2.2.1 Configuration
        2. 6.2.2.2 Setup
        3. 6.2.2.3 Operation
    3. 6.3 SHA2
      1. 6.3.1 SHA Introduction
        1. 6.3.1.1 SHA Features
      2. 6.3.2 SHA Performance
      3. 6.3.3 SHA Usage
        1. 6.3.3.1 Configuration
        2. 6.3.3.2 Setup
        3. 6.3.3.3 Operation
    4. 6.4 PKA
      1. 6.4.1 PKA Introduction
        1. 6.4.1.1 PKA features
      2. 6.4.2 PKA Usage
        1. 6.4.2.1 Configuration
        2. 6.4.2.2 Setup
        3. 6.4.2.3 Operation
    5. 6.5 PQC
      1. 6.5.1 ML-DSA
        1. 6.5.1.1 ML-DSA Introduction
        2. 6.5.1.2 ML-DSA Usage
          1. 6.5.1.2.1 Configuration
          2. 6.5.1.2.2 Setup
          3. 6.5.1.2.3 Operation
  10. 7Revision History

Boot Service

The tables below depicts the boot services using the DSSM. BCR will handle and execute these DSSM commands.

There are different kinds of services supported by ROM for DSSM, these can be broadly categorized in to

  1. No Authentication - In this scenario the command is open and doesn't need any authentication.
  2. Password based authentication - All the commands that can access the data in the memory directly or indirectly, are password protected. The password is configurable in the BCR/BSL configuration in Non-main memory.
  3. Secure Service - In HS-SE all DSSM services require certificate based authentication.
Table 2-4 DSSM Service for different lifecycle
Command Service Description HSFS HSKP HSSE HSFA/BAD/ DCOM
0x03 DSSM_WAIT_FOR_DEBUG

L0 - no auth

L1, L2 - Password in DEBUG_LOCK(1)

Not Valid Not Valid Not Valid
0x04 DSSM_INVOKE_BSL Invoke BSL No Auth Not Valid Not Valid Not Valid
0x05 DSSM_FACTORY_RESET Erases all user flash content and resets device to factory state No auth or Password in FACTORY_RESET(1) Not Valid Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2) Not Valid
0x06 DSSM_MASS_ERASE Erases entire flash memory No auth or Password in MASS_ERASE(1) Not Valid Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2) Not Valid
0x07 DSSM_COMMAND_DEBUG Opens secure debug access on device using the certificate authentication

L0 - no need

L1, L2 - Password in DEBUG_LOCK(1)

Not Valid

L0 - no need

L1, L2 - Secure Service verified by Mpuk7(2)(3)

Not Valid
0x0A DSSM_GET_LIFECYCLE Reads device lifecycle state No Auth No Auth No Auth No Auth
0x0B DSSM_GET_DEVICE_ID Reads 96-bit device ID

L0 - no auth

L1, L2 - Password in DEBUG_LOCK(1)

Not Valid

L0 - no auth

L1, L2 - Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2)

Not Valid
0x0D DSSM_COMMAND_RMA (CUSTOMER) Customer RMA certificate-authenticated request. Not Valid Not Valid Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2) Not Valid
0x0E DSSM_SECURE_KEY_PROVISIONING Start key provision flow no Auth Not Valid Not Valid Not Valid
0x0F DSSM_SECURE_KEY_SERVICES Revoke cryptographic keys Not Valid Not Valid Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2) Not Valid
0x12 DSSM_COMMAND_DEBUG_NS Opens non-secure debug access on device using the certificate authentication

L0, L1 - no need

L2 - Password in DEBUG_NS_LOCK(1)

Not Valid

L0, L1 - no need

L2 - Secure Service verified by Mpuk6(2)(3)

Not Valid
0x15 DSSM_CONVERT_BAD_DEVICE Convert the device state into BAD/DECOM Password in BAD_CONV(1) Not Valid Secure Service verified by active DSSM key in Mpuk6 and Mpuk7(2) Not Valid
0x16 DSSM_COMMAND_GET_SOC_ID Reads 128-bit SOC ID No Auth Not Valid No Auth Not Valid
debug_lock, debug_ns_lock, factory_reset, mass_erase, bad_conv are all the registers in nonmain flash for password setting.
mpuk6 and mpuk7 are the customer keys provisioned in otp region, which are used for dssm certificate verification.
If mpuk6 is revoked, ns debug unlock is unavailable. However, s debug unlock will always be available and uses mpuk7.