SWRA825 January   2025 IWR6843 , LP87745-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2.   Abstract
  3.   Trademarks
  4. 1Introduction
    1. 1.1 Regulatory Needs for Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment (ESPE)
    2. 1.2 Different Types of Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment (ESPE)
  5. 2Advantages of Radar Sensors in Industrial Applications
  6. 3Safety Concept Evaluation/Analysis
    1. 3.1 System Requirements
      1. 3.1.1 Stationary Use Case
      2. 3.1.2 Mobile Use Case
    2. 3.2 Considerations for Sensing Architectures
      1. 3.2.1 System Level Architecture
        1. 3.2.1.1 Bi-Static With Spatial Diversity
        2. 3.2.1.2 Co-Located Bi-Static (Two Sensor Products)
        3. 3.2.1.3 Co-Located Bi-Static (Single Sensor Product, Dual IWR6843)
        4. 3.2.1.4 Mono-Static (Single Sensor Product, Single IWR6843)
        5. 3.2.1.5 Summary
      2. 3.2.2 Latent Fault Monitoring
    3. 3.3 Sensor Level Architecture
      1. 3.3.1 Sensor Level Architecture for CAT 2
      2. 3.3.2 Sensor Level Architecture for Cat 3
  7. 4IEC TS 61496-5 Functional Test Results
  8. 5Other Considerations
    1. 5.1 Vibrations
    2. 5.2 Clock
  9. 6Conclusion
  10. 7References

Sensor Level Architecture

The required performance level for both stationary and mobile use case is Pld. PLd can be achieved by either using Category 2 (Cat 2) or Category 3 (Cat 3) architecture (see Figure 3-9) as defined per ISO 13849-1.

With "Category" the ISO 13849-1 standard specifies the resistance to faults. For a Cat 2 this would be a Single channel plus diagnostics as seen in Figure 3-11. For a Cat 3, this would be a dual channel plus diagnostics architecture and no accumulation of faults.

The designated architectures cannot be considered only as circuit diagrams but also as logical diagrams. For category 3, this means that not all parts are necessarily physically redundant but that there are redundant means of assuring that a fault cannot lead to the loss of the safety function. Main relevant understanding of a Cat 3 architecture is that every single failure does not lead in a loss of the safety function. A change into a safe state in case of a fault is okay. Therefore, for a fail-safe application the requirement for single-fault tolerance does not necessarily mean that a two-channel system must be implemented. Also, a single channel system with a high standard of monitoring that responds to a fault with a dedicated deactivation path sufficiently quickly for a dangerous state to be avoided can be fulfill Cat 3.

 Designated Architectures for
                    Categories 2 and 3 per IEC 13849-1 Figure 3-11 Designated Architectures for Categories 2 and 3 per IEC 13849-1

At the sensor level, there are two main possible architectures for PLd:

  • A logical dual-channel approach, leveraging IWR6843 unique hardware architecture in combination with the safety PMIC LP87745, which would allow a CAT 3
  • A SW diversity approach and higher diagnostics in combination with the safety PMIC LP87745, which would allow at least CAT 2