SFFS948 May   2025 MSPM0L1227-Q1 , MSPM0L1228-Q1 , MSPM0L2227-Q1 , MSPM0L2228-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2. 1Introduction
    1.     Trademarks
  3. 2 MSPM0Lx22x-Q1 Hardware Component Functional Safety Capability
  4. 3Development Process for Management of Systematic Faults
    1. 3.1 TI New-Product Development Process
    2. 3.2 TI Functional Safety Development Process
  5. 4 MSPM0Lx22x-Q1 Component Overview
    1. 4.1 Targeted Applications
    2. 4.2 Hardware Component Functional Safety Concept
    3. 4.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions
  6. 5Description of Hardware Component Parts
    1. 5.1  ADC
    2. 5.2  Comparator
    3. 5.3  CPU
    4. 5.4  RAM
    5. 5.5  FLASH
    6. 5.6  GPIO
    7. 5.7  DMA
    8. 5.8  SPI
    9. 5.9  I2C
    10. 5.10 UART
    11. 5.11 Timers (TIMx)
    12. 5.12 Power Management Unit (PMU)
    13. 5.13 Clock Module (CKM)
    14. 5.14 Events
    15. 5.15 IOMUX
    16. 5.16 VREF
    17. 5.17 WWDT and IWDT
    18. 5.18 CRC
  7. 6 MSPM0Lx22x-Q1 Management of Random Faults
    1. 6.1 Fault Reporting
    2. 6.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories
    3. 6.3 Description of Functional Safety Mechanisms
      1. 6.3.1  ADC1, COMP1, DMA1, GPIO2, TIM2, I2C2, IOMUX1, SPI2, UART2, SYSCTL5, CPU4, CRC1, EVENT1, REF1, WDT1, VBAT2:Periodic Read of Static Configuration Registers
      2. 6.3.2  ADC2: Software Test of Functionality
      3. 6.3.3  ADC3: ADC Trigger Overflow Check
      4. 6.3.4  ADC4: Window Comparator
      5. 6.3.5  ADC5: Test of Window Comparator
      6. 6.3.6  ADC6: ADC Trigger, Output Plausibility Checks
      7. 6.3.7  COMP3: External Pin Input to COMP
      8. 6.3.8  COMP4: Comparator Hysteresis
      9. 6.3.9  WDT: Windowed Watchdog Timer
      10. 6.3.10 WDT2: WWDT Counter Check
      11. 6.3.11 WDT3: WWDT Software Test
      12. 6.3.12 WDT4: Redundant WDT
      13. 6.3.13 IWDT: Independent Watchdog Timer
      14. 6.3.14 REF2: VREF to ADC Reference Input
      15. 6.3.15 CPU1: CPU Test Using Software Test Library
      16. 6.3.16 CPU2: Software Test of CPU Data Busses
      17. 6.3.17 CPU3: Software Diversified Redundancy
      18. 6.3.18 SYSMEM1: Software Read of Memory, DMA Write
      19. 6.3.19 SYSMEM2: DMA Read from SRAM, CPU Write
      20. 6.3.20 SYSMEM7: ECC Protection on SRAM
      21. 6.3.21 SYSMEM8: ECC Logic Test
      22. 6.3.22 SYSMEM9: RAM Software Test
      23. 6.3.23 FLASH1: Flash Single-Error Correction, Double-Error Detection Mechanism
      24. 6.3.24 FLASH2: Flash CRC
      25. 6.3.25 FXBAR2: Periodic Software Read Back of Flash Data
      26. 6.3.26 FXBAR3: Software Test of ECC Checker Logic
      27. 6.3.27 FXBAR4: Write Protection of Flash
      28. 6.3.28 DMA2: Software Test of DMA Function
      29. 6.3.29 DMA3: Software DMA Channel Test
      30. 6.3.30 DMA4: CRC Check of the Transferred Data
      31. 6.3.31 GPIO1: Online Monitoring Using I/O Loopback
      32. 6.3.32 GPIO3: GPIO Multiple (Redundant) Inputs/Outputs
      33. 6.3.33 TIM1: Test for PWM Generation
      34. 6.3.34 TIM3: Test for Fault Generation
      35. 6.3.35 TIM4: Fault Detection to Take the PWMs to Safe State
      36. 6.3.36 TIM5: Input Capture on Two or More Timer Instances
      37. 6.3.37 TIM6: Timer Period Monitoring
      38. 6.3.38 I2C1: Software Test of I2C Function Using Internal Loopback Mechanism
      39. 6.3.39 I2C3, SPI4, UART3, MCAN2: Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing
      40. 6.3.40 I2C4, SPI5, UART4: Transmission Redundancy
      41. 6.3.41 I2C5, UART5: Timeout Monitoring
      42. 6.3.42 I2C6: Test of CRC Function
      43. 6.3.43 I2C7: Packet Error Check in SMBUS Mode
      44. 6.3.44 IOMUX2: IOMUX Coverage as Part of Other IP Safety Mechanisms
      45. 6.3.45 SPI1: Software Test of SPI Function
      46. 6.3.46 SPI3: SPI Periodic Safety Message Exchange
      47. 6.3.47 UART1: Software Test of UART Function
      48. 6.3.48 UART6: UART Error Flags
      49. 6.3.49 UART7: UART Glitch filter
      50. 6.3.50 SYSCTL1: MCLK Monitor
      51. 6.3.51 SYSCTL2: HFCLK Start-Up Monitor
      52. 6.3.52 SYSCTL3: LFCLK Monitor
      53. 6.3.53 SYSCTL8: Brownout Reset (BOR) Supervisor
      54. 6.3.54 SYSCTL9: FCC Counter Logic to Calculate Clock Frequencies
      55. 6.3.55 SYSCTL10: External Voltage Monitor
      56. 6.3.56 SYSCTL11: Boot Process Monitor
      57. 6.3.57 SYSCTL14: Brownout Voltage Monitor
      58. 6.3.58 SYSCTL15: External Voltage Monitor
      59. 6.3.59 SYSCTL16: External Watchdog Timer
      60. 6.3.60 CRC: CRC Checker
      61. 6.3.61 VBAT1: VBAT Supply Monitor
      62. 6.3.62 Safety Mechanisms Covering PIN Failures
      63. 6.3.63 Safety Mechanisms Covering Common Cause Failures
  8.   A Summary of Recommended Functional Safety Mechanism Usage
  9.   B Distributed Developments
    1.     B.1 How the Functional Safety Lifecycle Applies to TI Functional Safety Products
    2.     B.2 Activities Performed by Texas Instruments
    3.     B.3 Information Provided
  10.   C Revision History

6.3.39 I2C3, SPI4, UART3, MCAN2: Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing

End-to-end safing includes a combination of techniques like information redundancy (adding CRC checks to the payload, for example), redundant transmissions, time diversity in transmissions, and so forth. Most commonly, checksums are added to the payload section of a transmission to verify the correctness of a transmission. The checksums, sequence counter, and timeout expectation (or time stamp) are applied, in addition to any protocol-level parity and checksums. As these parameters are generated and evaluated by the software, at either end of the communication, the whole communication path is safed, resulting in end-to-end safing.

Note: Medium coverage using CRC can be claimed under following circumstances:
  1. Medium overall coverage of failure modes in data transmission; a Hamming distance of three or more.
  2. A CRC value for message information is embedded in message; with a CRC size of 8 bits and a 0x97 polynomial results in a Hamming distance of four for a data length of less than 119 bits. The transmitter includes the CRC value mentioned and the receiver confirms the data after calculating and comparing the CRC value (typically used in a LIN bus).
  3. A CRC value for message information and message ID is embedded in the message; with a CRC size of 10 bits and a 0x319 polynomial results in a Hamming distance of four for a data length of less than 501 bits. The transmitter includes the CRC value mentioned and the receiver confirms the data after calculating and comparing the CRC value.
  4. A CRC value for message information and message ID is embedded in the message; with a CRC size of 15 bits and a 0x4599 polynomial results in a Hamming distance of five for a data length of less than 127 bits. Additionally, burst errors of a length up to 15 can be detected. The transmitter includes the CRC value mentioned and the receiver confirms the data after calculating and comparing the CRC value (as used in CAN).
  5. A CRC value for message information is embedded in the message, with a CRC size of 24 bits and a 0x5D6DCB polynomial results in a Hamming distance of the CRC of six for a data length of less than, or equal to, 248 bytes and a Hamming distance of the CRC of four for a data length of greater than 248 bytes. The transmitter includes the CRC value mentioned and the receiver confirms the data after calculating and comparing the CRC value (as used in FlexRay™ for the frame CRC).
  6. A CRC value for message header (including the message ID) is embedded in the message; with a CRC size of 11 bits and a 0x385 polynomial results in a Hamming distance of six for a data length of less than, or equal to, 20 bits. The transmitter includes the CRC value mentioned and the receiver confirms the data after calculating and comparing the CRC value (as used in FlexRay™ for the header CRC).