STDA050 October   2026 AM2431 , AM2432 , AM2434 , AM623 , AM625 , AM625-Q1 , AM625SIP , AM62A1-Q1 , AM62A3 , AM62A3-Q1 , AM62A7 , AM62A7-Q1 , AM62L , AM62P , AM62P-Q1 , AM6411 , AM6412 , AM6421 , AM6422 , AM6441 , AM6442 , AM67 , AM67A , AM68 , AM68A , AM69 , AM69A , DRA821U , DRA829J , DRA829V , TDA4AEN-Q1 , TDA4AH-Q1 , TDA4AL-Q1 , TDA4AP-Q1 , TDA4APE-Q1 , TDA4VE-Q1 , TDA4VEN-Q1 , TDA4VH-Q1 , TDA4VL-Q1 , TDA4VM , TDA4VM-Q1 , TDA4VP-Q1 , TDA4VPE-Q1 , TDA54-Q1

 

  1.   1
  2.   Abstract
  3. 1Introduction
  4. 2CRA Scope and the Component Supplier Question
    1. 2.1 What the Regulation Covers
    2. 2.2 How the CRA Classifies TI Products
    3. 2.3 The Integration Boundary
  5. 3Shared Responsibility Model
    1. 3.1 The Supply Chain Stack
    2. 3.2 Responsibility Allocation by CRA Requirement
    3. 3.3 The Tier 1 and SoM Vendor Layer
  6. 4TI's Security Capabilities Relevant to CRA
    1. 4.1 Hardware Security Capabilities
    2. 4.2 SDK and Software Security
    3. 4.3 Documentation and Lifecycle Artifacts
  7. 5Conclusion
  8. 6References

Hardware Security Capabilities

Security-capable TI processors include a dedicated security subsystem that runs on cores isolated from the main application processors and enforces the hardware root of trust through TI-supplied firmware (TI Foundational Security - TIFS). On newer-generation devices, a second dedicated security core is available for customer HSM software stacks, enabling cryptographic services without exposing key material to application-domain software.

A public key permanently provisioned into the silicon at production time anchors secure boot. On security-enforced (HS-SE) device variants, the boot ROM verifies a digital signature on the primary firmware image before execution and rejects images that fail verification, providing hardware-enforced integrity and authenticity verification from power-on.

Hardware access control partitions on-chip memory into zones assigned to each processing domain, preventing unauthorized reads or writes across workload boundaries.

On security-capable device variants, the debug interface can be permanently disabled for production units, or restricted to access only after a request is authenticated through a signed certificate, closing common attack vectors that exploit debugging tools.

Each chip carries a unique die ID alongside the part number, enabling precise identification of the specific silicon instance and supporting product identification requirements.